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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  is	  meant	  to	  link	  the	  philosophical	  debate	  concerning	  the	  
underdetermination	  of	  theories	  by	  evidence	  with	  a	  rather	  significant	  socio-­‐political	  issue	  
that	  has	  been	  taking	  place	  in	  Canada	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years:	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘death	  of	  
evidence’	  controversy.	  It	  places	  this	  debate	  within	  a	  broader	  philosophical	  framework	  by	  
discussing	  the	  connection	  between	  evidence	  and	  theory;	  by	  bringing	  out	  the	  role	  of	  
epistemic	  values	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  scientific	  method;	  and	  by	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  social	  
values	  in	  science.	  While	  it	  should	  be	  admitted	  that	  social	  values	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
science,	  the	  key	  question	  for	  anyone	  who	  advocates	  this	  view	  is:	  what	  and	  whose	  values?	  
The	  way	  it	  is	  answered	  makes	  an	  important	  epistemic	  difference	  to	  how	  the	  relation	  
between	  evidence	  and	  theory	  is	  appraised.	  I	  first	  review	  various	  arguments	  for	  the	  claim	  
that	  evidence	  underdetermines	  theory	  and	  shows	  their	  presuppositions	  and	  limitations,	  
using	  conceptual	  analysis	  and	  historical	  examples.	  After	  broaching	  the	  relation	  between	  
evidence	  and	  method	  in	  science	  by	  highlighting	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate	  epistemic	  values	  
into	  the	  scientific	  method,	  my	  discussion	  focuses	  on	  recent	  arguments	  for	  the	  role	  of	  social	  
values	  in	  science.	  Finally,	  I	  address	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  approach	  outlined	  for	  the	  current	  
‘death	  of	  evidence’	  debate	  in	  Canada.	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1	  This	  paper	  begun	  its	  life	  as	  a	  philosophical	  intervention	  in	  the	  ‘death	  of	  evidence’	  controversy	  in	  
Canada;	  hence,	  its	  seemingly	  strange	  title.	  My	  talk	  took	  place	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Toronto	  in	  April	  
2014,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Lives	  of	  Evidence	  National	  Lectures	  Series,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Situating	  
Science	  research	  project	  and	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Institute	  for	  the	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  
Science	  and	  Technology,	  the	  Jackman	  Humanities	  Institute	  Working	  Group	  on	  Scientific	  Evidence	  and	  
the	  Rotman	  Canada	  Research	  Chair	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  Western	  University.	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  
Gordon	  McOuat	  and	  Brian	  Baigrie	  for	  their	  kind	  invitation;	  the	  audience	  of	  the	  talk	  for	  challenging	  
questions;	  Martin	  Vezer	  and	  Ingo	  Brigandt	  for	  useful	  written	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  draft;	  and	  two	  
anonymous	  reviewers	  for	  their	  penetrating	  comments.	  Most	  of	  all,	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  wholeheartedly	  
Maya	  Goldenberg	  and	  Helena	  Likwornik	  for	  thoughtful,	  deep	  and	  challenging	  critical	  comments	  
during	  the	  event	  in	  Toronto.	  I	  dedicate	  this	  paper	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  Joseph	  L	  Rotman,	  a	  passionate	  
friend	  of	  philosophy.	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On	  the	  10th	  of	  July	  2012	  about	  two	  thousand	  scientists	  held	  a	  rally	  on	  Parliament	  Hill	  in	  
Ottawa	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  Stephen	  Harper	  Administration’s	  sweeping	  cuts	  to	  research.	  
They	  marched	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  the	  capital	  of	  Canada	  holding	  a	  mock	  funeral	  to	  mourn	  what	  
they	  thought	  was	  ‘the	  death	  of	  evidence’	  and	  the	  muzzling	  of	  scientists	  by	  the	  government.	  
They	  protested	  against	  closure	  of	  the	  Experimental	  Lakes	  Area,	  the	  Polar	  Environment	  
Atmospheric	  Research	  Laboratory	  and	  the	  First	  Nations	  Statistical	  Institute.	  As	  Katie	  Gibbs,	  a	  
PhD	  student	  in	  the	  biology	  department	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Ottawa,	  who	  spoke	  in	  the	  rally,	  
said,	  the	  demonstration	  was	  “to	  commemorate	  the	  untimely	  death	  of	  evidence	  in	  Canada.”	  
Slightly	  more	  optimistic	  was	  Scott	  Findlay,	  associate	  professor	  and	  former	  director	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  Ottawa’s	  Institute	  of	  Environment,	  who	  said:	  “evidence	  is	  not	  quite	  dead,	  but	  it	  
is	  at	  the	  very	  least	  at	  death’s	  door”.3	  
	   In	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  event	  scientists,	  activists	  and	  public	  opinion-­‐makers	  in	  Canada	  have	  
launched	  a	  campaign	  (which	  has	  mobilised	  scientists	  in	  ‘Stand	  Up	  for	  Science’	  rallies	  in	  17	  
Canadian	  cities)	  aiming	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  conservative	  government’s	  ‘war	  on	  science’,	  to	  
promote	  the	  value	  of	  evidence	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  following	  an	  evidence-­‐based	  policy.	  A	  
key	  slogan	  of	  this	  campaign	  is:	  “no	  science,	  no	  evidence,	  no	  truth,	  no	  democracy.”	  	  
This	  has	  been	  a	  campaign	  about	  the	  value	  of	  science	  (and	  in	  particular	  of	  evidence	  in	  
science).	  But	  it	  is	  also	  a	  campaign	  which	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  values	  in	  science.	  The	  ‘death	  of	  
evidence’	  debate	  is	  a	  debate	  about	  competing	  sets	  of	  values	  and	  the	  role	  of	  them	  in	  science.	  	  
This	  controversy,	  important	  though	  it	  is,	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  philosophical	  
examination.4	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  place	  ‘the	  death	  of	  evidence’	  controversy	  within	  a	  
broader	  philosophical	  framework	  by	  discussing	  the	  connection	  between	  evidence	  and	  
theory;	  by	  bringing	  out	  the	  role	  of	  epistemic	  values	  in	  the	  method	  of	  science;	  and	  by	  
examining	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  science.	  	  
	   I	  hope	  that	  this	  paper	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  both	  scientists	  and	  philosophers.	  I	  will	  first	  
challenge	  the	  credentials	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  underdetermination	  of	  theories	  by	  evidence	  
and	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  values	  are	  indispensable	  in	  theory-­‐choice.	  I	  will	  then	  focus	  my	  
attention	  on	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  science,	  and	  capitalising	  on	  the	  work	  of	  standpoint	  
epistemologists,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  key	  question	  about	  social	  values	  in	  science	  is:	  what	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  the	  Globe	  and	  Mail	  10/07/2012	  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/scientists-­‐
take-­‐aim-­‐at-­‐harper-­‐cuts-­‐with-­‐death-­‐of-­‐evidence-­‐protest-­‐on-­‐parliament-­‐hill/article4403233/	  
4	  For	  a	  detailed	  and	  passionate	  account	  of	  this	  controversy,	  and	  the	  evidence	  there	  is	  for	  Harper’s	  
administration	  ‘war	  on	  science’,	  see	  Chris	  Turner	  (2013).	  See	  also	  Linnit	  (2013).	  Heather	  Douglas	  has	  
also	  published	  a	  short	  piece	  in	  The	  Scientist	  Magazine	  in	  April	  2,	  2013.	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whose	  values?	  Next,	  I	  will	  claim	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  turns	  on	  the	  
universalisability	  of	  otherwise	  perspectival	  values.	  This	  will	  ground	  their	  objectivity	  without	  
falling	  foul	  of	  the	  chimerical	  value-­‐free	  ideal	  of	  science.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  apply	  this	  idea	  to	  the	  
‘death	  of	  evidence’	  debate.	  	  
	   	  
2. Evidence	  and	  theory	  
2.1 Evidence	  and	  observational	  consequences	  of	  a	  theory	  
The	  claim	  that	  evidence	  underdetermines	  theory	  rests	  on	  an	  empirical	  fact	  and	  a	  logical	  fact.	  
The	  empirical	  fact	  is	  that	  all	  interesting	  scientific	  theories	  have	  excess	  content	  over	  and	  
above	  the	  various	  observations,	  data	  and	  other	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  that	  probe	  them	  and	  
guide	  their	  formation.	  The	  logical	  fact	  is	  that	  deduction	  being	  what	  it	  is,	  there	  cannot	  be	  a	  
deductively	  valid	  argument	  whose	  sole	  premises	  are	  statements	  expressing	  available	  
observational	  evidence	  and	  whose	  conclusion	  is	  a	  theory	  whose	  content	  exceeds	  whatever	  it	  
is	  asserted	  by	  the	  premises.	  Given	  these	  two	  facts,	  if	  the	  theory	  is	  not	  just	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  
available	  evidence,	  the	  evidence	  cannot	  possibly	  prove	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  theory.	  Differently	  
put,	  the	  relation	  between	  evidence	  and	  theory	  is	  ampliative.	  	  
	   These	  two	  facts	  are	  taken	  to	  generate	  an	  epistemological	  question:	  how	  can	  we	  ever	  
justifiably	  believe	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  theory	  whose	  content	  exceeds	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
evidence?	  Answering	  this	  question	  has	  been	  the	  province	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  confirmation.	  But	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  evidence	  justifying	  belief	  in	  a	  theory:	  given	  
that	  the	  evidence	  does	  not	  entail	  a	  theory,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  two	  or	  more	  rival	  theories	  may	  
entail	  the	  same	  evidence;	  how	  then	  can	  the	  evidence	  support	  one	  of	  the	  theories	  more	  than	  
its	  rivals?	  What	  is	  normally	  added	  to	  this	  challenge	  is	  that	  for	  any	  finite	  body	  of	  evidence,	  
there	  always	  will	  be	  more	  than	  one	  rival	  theories	  which	  entail	  that	  evidence.5	  	  
	   There	  is	  no	  general	  and	  uncontroversial	  proof	  that	  for	  any	  theory	  scientists	  come	  up	  with	  
(and	  any	  body	  of	  evidence)	  there	  always	  will	  be	  scientifically	  interesting	  (and	  scientifically	  
plausible)	  empirically	  equivalent	  rivals.	  André	  Kukla	  (2001)	  has	  proposed	  certain	  algorithms	  
for	  the	  construction	  of	  empirically	  equivalent	  rivals	  to	  any	  theory	  T.	  Here	  are	  his	  two	  of	  
them:	  
Algorithm	  1:	  “For	  any	  theory	  T,	  construct	  the	  theory	  T1	  which	  asserts	  that	  the	  empirical	  
consequences	  of	  T	  are	  true,	  but	  that	  none	  of	  its	  theoretical	  entities	  exist”	  (2001,	  22-­‐3).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Algorithm	  2:	  “Given	  theory	  T,	  construct	  T2	  which	  asserts	  that	  T	  holds	  when	  somebody	  is	  
observing	  something,	  but	  that	  when	  there’s	  no	  observation	  going	  on,	  the	  universe	  follows	  
the	  laws	  of	  some	  other	  theory	  T’”	  (2001,	  23).	  	  
Even	  though	  there	  might	  be	  some	  philosophical	  motivation	  for	  these	  algorithms	  (they	  
underpin	  various	  sceptical	  stances),	  there	  is	  no	  scientific	  motivation	  for	  them.	  T1	  and	  T2	  are	  
not	  theories,	  strictly	  speaking.	  They	  are	  totally	  parasitic	  on	  a	  proper	  scientific	  theory	  T.	  
Algorithm	  1	  simply	  captures	  denialism	  about	  unobservables.	  T1	  has	  no	  independent	  
scientific	  motivation.	  As	  for	  theory	  T2	  (in	  algorithm	  2),	  it	  is	  not	  even	  empirically	  equivalent	  
with	  a	  proper	  theory	  T	  since	  T	  implies	  nothing	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  observers,	  while	  T2	  
implies	  that	  there	  are	  observers.	  
Even	  if	  one	  adopted	  simple	  versions	  of	  the	  hypothetico-­‐deductive	  method	  of	  
confirmation,	  there	  would	  still	  be	  good	  reason	  for	  resisting	  underdetermination:	  there	  is	  
more	  to	  empirical	  evidence	  than	  the	  observational	  consequences	  of	  a	  theory.	  Two	  
arguments	  help	  us	  see	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  	  
First,	  since	  theories	  entail	  observational	  consequences	  only	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  auxiliary	  
assumptions,	  and	  since	  the	  available	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  may	  change	  over	  time,	  the	  set	  of	  
observational	  consequences	  of	  a	  theory	  is	  not	  circumscribed	  once	  and	  for	  all;	  it	  is	  temporally	  
indexed.	  Hence,	  even	  if	  for	  any	  time	  t,	  two	  (or	  more)	  theories	  may	  entail	  the	  same	  
observational	  consequences,	  there	  may	  be	  future	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  such	  that,	  when	  
conjoined	  with	  one	  of	  them,	  say	  T,	  fresh	  observational	  consequences	  follow	  that	  can	  shift	  
the	  evidential	  balance	  in	  favour	  of	  T	  over	  its	  rivals.6	  
Second,	  theories	  may	  get	  support	  from	  pieces	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  
their	  observational	  consequences.	  Hence,	  the	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  that	  can	  support	  a	  theory	  is	  
broader	  than	  the	  set	  of	  the	  observational	  consequences	  of	  the	  theory.	  
I	  will	  illustrate	  each	  of	  these	  two	  arguments	  with	  a	  historical	  case.	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  
first	  kind	  of	  case	  concerns	  the	  discovery	  of	  planet	  Neptune.	  Here	  it	  is	  in	  outline.	  Planet	  
Uranus	  was	  discovered	  by	  William	  Herschel	  in	  1781.	  The	  so	  called	  ‘problem	  of	  Uranus’	  was	  
that	  the	  trajectory	  of	  this	  planet	  had	  proved	  to	  be	  intractable.	  Following	  Laplace’s	  
monumental	  calculations	  of	  the	  mutual	  perturbations	  exerted	  by	  the	  planets,	  Alexis	  Bouvard	  
tried	  in	  1821	  to	  calculate	  the	  tables	  predicting	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  three	  giant	  planets:	  
Jupiter,	  Saturn	  and	  Uranus.	  Uranus’	  positions	  were	  not	  the	  ones	  predicted	  by	  the	  Newton-­‐
Laplace	  theory	  even	  after	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  perturbations	  exerted	  by	  the	  other	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  Sober	  (1999)	  has	  exploited	  this	  feature	  of	  evidence	  in	  his	  own	  account	  of	  contrastive/comparative	  




planets.	  For	  our	  purposes	  what	  needs	  highlighting	  is	  that	  the	  predicted	  motions	  of	  Uranus—
those	  that	  were	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  actual	  record	  of	  its	  observed	  motions—were	  the	  
consequence	  of	  conjoining	  the	  Newton-­‐Laplace	  theory	  with	  the	  auxiliary	  assumption	  that	  
the	  possibly	  disturbing	  planets	  were	  seven.	  It	  was	  Alexis	  Bouvard	  himself	  who	  first	  
speculated	  that	  a	  new	  planète	  troublante	  could	  cause	  the	  anomalous	  motion	  of	  Uranus.	  But	  
it	  was	  Urbain	  Le	  Verrier	  who	  in	  1846	  took	  on	  the	  task	  to	  calculate	  the	  position	  and	  mass	  of	  
the	  perturbing	  planet.	  	  
The	  logical	  structure,	  as	  it	  were,	  of	  the	  task	  was	  the	  following.	  Given	  a	  new	  auxiliary	  
assumption	  (a	  new	  perturbing	  planet)	  would	  it	  still	  follow	  that	  the	  trajectory	  of	  Uranus	  
would	  be	  anomalous?	  That	  is,	  would	  the	  new	  predicted	  value	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  
observational	  record?	  Mathematically,	  the	  problem	  was	  the	  inverse	  of	  this,	  viz.,	  to	  use	  the	  
perturbations	  as	  given	  and	  to	  calculate	  the	  position	  and	  mass	  of	  the	  planet	  that	  would	  cause	  
them	  if	  it	  were	  there.	  This	  involved	  some	  significant	  simplifications—e.g.,	  that	  the	  distance	  
of	  the	  planet	  from	  the	  sun	  is	  known.	  But	  in	  his	  presentation	  to	  the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  on	  1	  
June	  1846,	  Le	  Verrier	  could	  confidently	  announce:	  
	  
I	  conclude	  also	  that	  one	  can	  effectively	  model	  the	  irregularities	  of	  Uranus’s	  movements	  by	  the	  
action	  of	  a	  new	  planet	  placed	  at	  a	  distance	  of	  twice	  that	  of	  Uranus	  from	  the	  Sun;	  and	  what	  is	  
just	  as	  important,	  that	  one	  can	  arrive	  at	  the	  solution	  in	  only	  one	  way.	  To	  say	  that	  the	  problem	  
is	  susceptible	  to	  only	  one	  solution,	  I	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  not	  two	  regions	  in	  the	  sky	  in	  which	  
one	  can	  choose	  to	  place	  the	  planet	  in	  a	  given	  epoch	  (such	  as,	  for	  instance,	  1	  January	  1847).	  
Within	  this	  unique	  region,	  we	  can	  limit	  the	  object’s	  position	  within	  certain	  bounds.	  
	  
The	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  region	  was	  a	  significant	  result,	  even	  though	  there	  was	  still	  
considerable	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  planet’s	  exact	  location,	  since	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  interplay	  
between	  theory	  and	  evidence	  can	  lead	  to	  considerable	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  theoretical	  
space	  of	  possible	  alternatives.	  In	  the	  night	  of	  the	  23/24	  September	  1846,	  the	  astronomer	  
Johann	  Gottfried	  Galle	  in	  the	  Berlin	  observatory	  discovered	  the	  perturbing	  planet.	  Then	  a	  
number	  of	  astronomers,	  including	  Le	  Verrier,	  observed	  the	  planet.	  A	  few	  days	  later	  two	  
science	  journals	  announced	  the	  discovery.	  The	  planet	  was	  called	  Neptune,	  a	  name	  proposed	  
by	  Le	  Verrier.7	  
A	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  case	  concerns	  the	  theory	  that	  continents	  ‘drifted’	  
to	  their	  present	  position	  over	  millions	  of	  years—the	  well-­‐known	  ‘continental	  drift	  theory’	  
proposed	  by	  Alfred	  Wegener.	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  as	  it	  was	  later	  developed,	  when	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  book	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  is	  from	  p.	  28.	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tectonic	  plates	  move	  across	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Earth,	  they	  carry	  the	  continents	  with	  them.	  
The	  proposed	  theoretical	  mechanism	  for	  this	  is	  sea	  floor	  spreading,	  which	  was	  first	  proposed	  
by	  Harry	  Hess.	  In	  broad	  outline	  the	  idea	  is	  this.	  Molten	  magma	  from	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  
the	  earth	  rises	  and	  breaks	  the	  Earth’s	  crust	  in	  certain	  weak	  places.	  A	  place	  that	  this	  typically	  
happens	  is	  a	  spreading	  ridge,	  i.e.,	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  sea	  bed	  which	  is	  widening	  as	  the	  tectonic	  
plates	  move	  apart.	  The	  magma	  that	  fills	  these	  gaps	  cools	  and	  hardens,	  thereby	  pushing	  older	  
rock	  aside	  as	  new	  sea	  floor	  is	  created.	  If	  this	  theory	  is	  right,	  there	  must	  be	  spreading	  ridges	  
to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  oceans.	  Indeed,	  the	  largest	  of	  all	  these	  ridges	  is	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  Ridge,	  
which	  runs	  north	  to	  south	  down	  the	  length	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean.	  	  
But	  what	  is	  really	  noteworthy	  is	  that	  this	  theory	  gets	  unexpected	  support	  from	  some	  
piece	  of	  evidence	  that	  is	  not	  geological;	  nor	  is	  it	  implied	  by	  the	  theory.	  This	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  
magnetic	  stripping.	  Minerals	  that	  contain	  iron	  in	  the	  magma	  align	  themselves	  with	  the	  
magnetic	  field	  of	  the	  Earth	  as	  the	  magma	  cools.	  But	  the	  orientation	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  magnetic	  
field	  has	  changed	  polarity	  many	  times	  over	  history.	  Actually	  this	  is	  something	  evidence	  for	  
which	  became	  available	  fairly	  recently,	  viz.,	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  
expected	  that	  the	  rocks	  that	  make	  the	  sea	  bed	  would	  exhibit	  a	  pattern	  of	  polarity	  reversals	  
(from	  normal	  polarity	  to	  reverse	  polarity)	  depending	  on	  the	  polarity	  they	  recorded	  when	  
they	  cooled.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  was	  observed	  by	  scientists	  using	  magnetometers	  at	  
spreading	  ridges.8	  
	   Hence,	  empirical	  evidence	  can	  support	  a	  theory	  (and	  concomitantly,	  it	  can	  support	  a	  
theory	  more	  than	  its	  rivals)	  given	  that	  what	  counts	  as	  evidence	  for	  a	  theory	  changes	  over	  
time	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  observational	  consequences	  of	  the	  theory	  under	  test.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Prior	  probabilities	  
Laudan	  (1990,	  271)	  attributes	  to	  Quine	  (1975)	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  underdetermination	  thesis,	  
viz.,	  every	  theory	  is	  as	  well	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence	  as	  any	  of	  its	  (empirically	  equivalent)	  
rivals.	  It’s	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  Quine	  did	  entertain	  this	  view,	  though	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  next	  
sub-­‐section,	  there	  is	  a	  reading	  of	  him	  (associated	  with	  the	  Duhem-­‐Quine	  thesis)	  which	  is	  
amenable	  to	  this	  interpretation.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  this	  kind	  of	  view	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  
Popper’s	  anti-­‐inductivism.	  For	  on	  his	  account	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  evidence	  and	  theory	  
no	  evidence	  can	  ever	  inductively	  support	  any	  theory.	  But	  if	  we	  look	  at	  theories	  of	  
confirmation,	  then	  on	  any	  extant	  theory,	  the	  evidence	  can	  render	  a	  theory	  probable	  or	  more	  
probable	  than	  its	  rivals.	  So	  the	  claim	  that	  evidence	  underdetermines	  theory	  in	  the	  sense	  that	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  This	  point	  has	  been	  made	  by	  Laudan	  (1990).	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it	  can	  never	  render	  a	  theory	  probable	  (or	  more	  probable	  than	  its	  rivals)	  must	  rest	  on	  some	  
arguments	  that	  question	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  evidence	  can	  play	  a	  confirmatory	  role	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
the	  theory.	  I	  will	  examine	  one	  such	  type	  of	  argument.	  	  
It	  is	  well-­‐known	  that	  no	  evidence	  can	  affect	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  theory	  unless	  the	  
theory	  is	  assigned	  some	  non-­‐zero	  initial	  probability.	  In	  fact,	  given	  that	  two	  or	  more	  rival	  
theories	  are	  assigned	  different	  prior	  probabilities,	  the	  evidence	  can	  confirm	  one	  more	  than	  
the	  others.	  So,	  it	  is	  enough	  for	  differential	  confirmation	  by	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  rival	  
theories	  have	  been	  assigned	  different	  prior	  probabilities	  (cf.	  Earman	  1992,	  150).	  The	  
challenge,	  then,	  is:	  where	  do	  these	  prior	  probabilities	  come	  from?	  In	  particular:	  how	  can	  
prior	  probabilities	  have	  any	  epistemic	  force?9	  
Subjective	  Bayesians	  appeal	  to	  subjective	  prior	  probabilities	  (degrees	  of	  belief)	  and	  rely	  
on	  convergence-­‐of-­‐opinion	  theorems	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  the	  prior	  probabilities	  
wash	  out:	  even	  widely	  different	  prior	  probabilities	  will	  converge,	  in	  the	  limit,	  to	  the	  same	  
posterior	  probability,	  if	  agents	  conditionalise	  on	  the	  same	  evidence.	  But,	  though	  true,	  this	  
move	  offers	  little	  consolation	  in	  the	  present	  context	  because,	  apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  
long-­‐run	  we	  are	  all	  dead,	  the	  convergence-­‐of-­‐opinion	  theorem	  holds	  only	  under	  limited	  and	  
very	  well-­‐defined	  circumstances	  that	  can	  hardly	  be	  met	  in	  ordinary	  scientific	  cases	  (cf.	  
Earman	  1992,	  149ff).	  
Is	  there	  an	  alternative	  way	  to	  fix	  prior	  probabilities?	  There	  have	  been	  great	  strides	  
towards	  developing	  objective	  Bayesianism	  and	  various	  ways	  to	  use	  statistical	  methods	  to	  fix	  
prior	  probabilities	  (see	  Williamson	  2010,	  especially	  pp.	  165ff).	  But	  I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  more	  
general	  point,	  viz.,	  that	  prior	  probabilities	  can	  have	  epistemic	  force	  because	  they	  can	  be	  
based	  on	  plausibility	  or	  explanatory	  judgements.	  And	  these	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  express	  rational	  
degrees	  of	  belief.	  Now,	  to	  start	  taking	  seriously	  this	  point	  requires	  that	  a	  broader	  conception	  
of	  rational	  belief	  is	  adopted	  and	  in	  particular	  one	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  topic-­‐neutral	  logic	  
of	  induction,	  which	  is	  supposedly	  based	  on	  a	  priori	  principles	  of	  rationality.10	  Such	  principles	  
are	  hard	  to	  find	  and	  even	  harder	  to	  justify.	  Still,	  there	  are	  rational	  grounds	  for	  assigning	  
initial	  degrees	  of	  plausibility	  to	  competing	  theories;	  relying,	  for	  instance,	  on	  theoretical	  
virtues	  such	  as	  simplicity,	  explanatory	  power,	  coherence	  with	  other	  theories,	  and	  fecundity.	  
These	  kinds	  of	  virtues	  are	  typically	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  makes	  scientists	  take	  a	  theory	  seriously	  as	  
subject	  to	  further	  exploration	  and	  test.	  These	  theoretical	  virtues	  are	  compatible	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue	  see	  Douven	  (2008).	  Likwornik	  (2015)	  discusses	  how	  prior	  probabilities	  
can	  be	  influenced	  by	  epistemic	  and	  social	  values.	  	  
10	  Recent	  attempts	  to	  deny	  the	  alleged	  topic-­‐neutrality	  of	  induction	  include	  Norton	  (2003)	  and	  
Brigandt	  (2010).	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broadly	  Bayesian	  probabilistic	  account	  of	  confirmation.	  But	  they	  also	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  
probabilistic	  but	  non-­‐Bayesian	  accounts	  of	  confirmation,	  such	  as	  Peter	  Achinstein’s	  (2001)	  
theory	  of	  evidence.	  Prior	  probabilities	  can	  certainly	  be	  whimsical,	  but	  they	  need	  not	  be.	  They	  
can	  be	  based	  on	  judgements	  of	  plausibility,	  on	  explanatory	  considerations	  prior	  to	  the	  
collection	  of	  fresh	  evidence	  and	  other	  such	  factors,	  which—though	  not	  algorithmic—are	  
quite	  objective	  in	  that	  their	  employment.11	  
	  
2.3 Empirical	  equivalence	  and	  the	  Duhem-­‐Quine	  thesis	  
Can	  there	  be	  totally	  empirically	  equivalent	  theories,	  i.e.,	  theories	  that	  entail	  exactly	  the	  
same	  observational	  consequences	  under	  any	  circumstances?	  The	  so-­‐called	  Duhem-­‐Quine	  
thesis	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	  an	  algorithm	  for	  generating	  empirically	  equivalent	  theories.	  
Briefly	  put,	  this	  thesis	  starts	  with	  the	  undeniable	  premise	  that	  all	  theories	  entail	  
observational	  consequences	  only	  with	  the	  help	  of	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  and	  concludes	  that	  
it	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  a	  theory	  together	  with	  suitable	  auxiliaries	  can	  accommodate	  any	  
recalcitrant	  evidence.	  A	  corollary,	  then,	  is	  that	  for	  any	  evidence	  and	  any	  two	  rival	  theories	  T	  
and	  T’,	  there	  are	  suitable	  auxiliaries	  A	  such	  that	  T’	  &	  A	  will	  be	  empirically	  equivalent	  to	  T	  
(together	  with	  its	  own	  auxiliaries).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  argued,	  no	  evidence	  can	  tell	  two	  theories	  
apart.	  	  
It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  Duhem-­‐Quine	  thesis	  is	  true.12	  There	  is	  no	  proof	  that	  non-­‐trivial	  
auxiliary	  assumptions	  can	  always	  be	  found.	  But	  let	  us	  assume,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument,	  
that	  it	  is	  true.	  What	  does	  it	  show?	  Not	  much	  really.	  From	  the	  alleged	  fact	  that	  any	  theory	  can	  
be	  suitably	  adjusted	  so	  that	  it	  resists	  refutation,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  all	  theories	  are	  
equally	  well-­‐confirmed	  by	  the	  evidence.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lend	  
equal	  inductive	  support	  to	  two	  empirically	  congruent	  theories	  since	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  
case	  that	  the	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  save	  a	  theory	  from	  refutation	  will	  
themselves	  be	  well	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence.	  Some	  auxiliary	  assumptions,	  for	  instance,	  
might	  be	  totally	  ad	  hoc,	  without	  any	  independent	  plausibility	  or	  testability;	  or	  even	  plain	  
wrong.	  	  
To	  illustrate	  this	  point	  lest	  us	  look	  at	  the	  case	  of	  Mercury.	  It	  was	  well	  known	  around	  1850	  
that	  the	  orbit	  of	  planet	  Mercury	  was	  anomalous.	  The	  predicted	  ellipse	  was	  not	  quite	  what	  
was	  observed.	  Actually,	  if	  attention	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  perihelion	  of	  Mercury	  (the	  point	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  For	  a	  specific	  case	  of	  how	  these	  explanatory	  consideration	  work	  in	  practice,	  see	  my	  2011.	  
12	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  literature	  on	  this	  thesis.	  See	  my	  1999,	  chapter	  7	  and	  the	  references	  therein.	  
For	  Quine’s	  views	  see	  (1975).	  Duhem’s	  case	  is	  more	  complicated	  and	  it	  is	  questionable	  that	  his	  
position	  is	  similar	  to	  Quine’s.	  For	  Duhem’s	  views	  see	  my	  1999,	  chapter	  3.	  See	  also	  Ariew	  (1984).	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closest	  to	  the	  Sun),	  then	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  this	  perihelion	  advances	  regularly	  with	  an	  
angular	  velocity	  usually	  expressed	  in	  seconds	  of	  arc	  per	  century.	  Here	  is	  a	  case	  similar	  to	  the	  
case	  of	  Neptune	  above.	  The	  Newton-­‐Laplace	  theory	  predicts,	  together	  with	  various	  
auxiliaries,	  an	  elliptical	  orbit	  for	  Mercury;	  but	  this	  is	  not	  quite	  observed.	  Even	  with	  modified	  
auxiliaries,	  by	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  perturbation	  by	  the	  other	  planets,	  most	  significantly	  by	  
Venus,	  the	  anomalous	  perihelion	  was	  not	  accounted	  for.	  One	  interesting	  modification	  of	  
auxiliary	  assumptions	  concerned	  the	  mass	  of	  Venus.	  If	  the	  mass	  of	  Venus	  was	  larger	  by	  10%	  
than	  what	  it	  was	  taken	  to	  be,	  this	  very	  fact	  would	  explain	  Mercury’s	  anomaly.	  But	  this	  new	  
auxiliary	  assumption	  could	  be	  independently	  tested.	  If	  the	  mass	  of	  Venus	  were	  larger,	  the	  
perturbations	  caused	  by	  Venus	  in	  the	  orbit	  of	  earth	  would	  be	  inadmissibly	  large.	  So	  Le	  
Verrier	  came	  up	  with	  a	  different	  hypothesis:	  
	  
A	  planet,	  or	  if	  one	  prefers	  a	  group	  of	  smaller	  planets	  circling	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Mercury’s	  orbit,	  
would	  be	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  anomalous	  perturbation	  felt	  by	  the	  latter	  planet….	  
According	  to	  this	  hypothesis,	  the	  mass	  sought	  should	  exist	  inside	  the	  orbit	  of	  Mercury.	  
	  
A	  new	  planet	  was	  therefore	  posited,	  which	  if	  it	  were	  present	  between	  Mercury	  and	  the	  Sun,	  
and	  if	  it	  had	  the	  right	  mass,	  it	  would	  perturb	  Mercury’s	  motion	  enough	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
anomalous	  perihelion.	  Though	  Le	  Verrier	  had	  doubts	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  planet,	  
there	  were	  some	  reported	  sightings	  of	  it	  and	  he	  came	  to	  accept	  its	  existence:	  he	  called	  it	  
Vulcan.	  But	  this	  new	  auxiliary	  hypothesis,	  which	  would	  save	  Newton’s	  theory	  from	  
refutation,	  could	  be	  independently	  tested—and	  further	  observations	  made	  showed	  the	  
presence	  of	  no	  such	  planet.	  In	  fact,	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  anomalous	  perihelion	  of	  Mercury	  had	  
to	  wait	  the	  advent	  of	  Einstein’s	  general	  Theory	  of	  relativity	  and	  the	  essential	  revision	  of	  
Newton’s	  theory	  of	  gravity.13	  
Evidence,	  therefore,	  can	  bear	  on	  theories	  in	  many	  and	  variegated	  ways,	  turning	  the	  
balance	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  theory	  over	  another.	  
	  
2.4 Evidence	  and	  epistemic	  values	  
Still,	  the	  evidence	  does	  not	  speak	  with	  the	  voice	  of	  an	  angel!	  Nor	  does	  it	  operate	  in	  a	  
theoretical	  and	  axiological	  vacuum.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  lesson	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  
from	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Duhem-­‐Quine	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Of	  the	  total	  574	  arc-­‐seconds	  per	  century	  precession,	  531	  arc-­‐seconds	  were	  accounted	  for	  by	  
Newtonian	  perturbation	  theory.	  43	  arc-­‐seconds	  anomaly	  remained	  unaccounted	  for,	  and	  a	  new	  
theory	  was	  required	  for	  its	  explanation.	  For	  the	  details	  of	  this	  case	  see	  James	  Lequeux	  (2013).	  The	  
quotation	  is	  from	  p.	  166.	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algorithmic	  relation	  between	  theory	  and	  evidence	  is	  bankrupt.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  claim,	  let	  us	  
take	  a	  leaf	  from	  Duhem’s	  (1906)	  masterpiece	  Aim	  and	  Structure	  of	  Physical	  Theory.	  Perhaps	  
more	  than	  anyone	  else,	  Duhem	  felt	  the	  fundamental	  tension	  between	  the	  strict	  conception	  
of	  scientific	  method	  that	  he	  himself	  had	  advocated	  in	  his	  attack	  on	  role	  of	  explanation	  in	  
science	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  rational	  judgment	  in	  science.	  He	  forcefully	  
argued	  that	  there	  is	  space	  for	  rational	  judgements	  in	  science	  which	  is	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  
slogan:	  scientific	  method=evidence	  +	  logic.	  What’s	  important	  here	  is	  that	  evidence-­‐plus-­‐logic	  
are	  not	  enough	  even	  to	  decide	  when	  a	  theory	  should	  be	  abandoned	  (or	  modified).	  	  
The	  cases	  of	  Uranus	  and	  Mercury	  are	  instructive.	  They	  concern	  the	  same	  theory—
Newton’s	  theory	  of	  gravity—and	  they	  have	  roughly	  the	  same	  conceptual	  structure:	  they	  are	  
about	  bringing	  Newton’s	  theory	  in	  line	  with	  anomalous	  trajectories	  of	  planets.	  And	  yet,	  in	  
the	  Uranus	  case,	  we	  have	  a	  triumph	  of	  Newton’s	  theory,	  whereas	  in	  the	  Mercury	  case	  we	  
have	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  theory.	  In	  the	  Uranus	  case,	  the	  blame	  is	  put	  on	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  
and	  the	  theory	  is	  saved	  from	  refutation;	  in	  the	  Mercury	  case,	  the	  blame	  is	  put	  on	  Newton’s	  
theory	  itself	  and	  the	  theory	  is	  abandoned.	  No	  algorithmic	  account	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  
evidence	  and	  theory	  can	  present	  both	  moves	  as	  rational.	  
But	  they	  both	  are!	  And	  to	  see	  why,	  let	  us	  pursue	  Duhem’s	  line	  of	  thought.	  Duhem	  made	  
famous	  what	  Poincaré	  had	  already	  noted	  by	  saying	  that	  though	  evidence	  does	  not,	  strictly	  
speaking,	  contradict	  a	  theory,	  it	  can	  condemn	  it.	  He	  is	  well-­‐known	  for	  his	  view	  that	  crucial	  
experiments	  are	  “impossible	  in	  physics”	  (1906,	  188).	  A	  crucial	  experiment	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  
experiment	  that	  would	  prove	  one	  theory	  wrong—one	  that	  would	  strictly	  contradict	  the	  
theory.	  If	  a	  situation	  such	  as	  this	  is	  not	  possible,	  how	  do	  theories	  get	  abandoned?	  Any	  
answer	  would	  have	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  strict	  limits	  of	  evidence	  and	  logic.	  And	  Duhem’s	  own	  
answer	  does.	  He	  employed	  other	  criteria	  of	  assessment.	  Here	  are	  some	  that	  he	  suggests:	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  theory,	  the	  number	  of	  hypotheses,	  the	  nature	  of	  hypotheses,	  novel	  predictions	  
(1906,	  28,	  195),	  compatibility	  with	  other	  theories	  (1906,	  221,	  255),	  unification	  into	  a	  single	  
system	  of	  hypotheses	  (1906,	  293).	  	  
These	  are,	  of	  course,	  the	  usual	  suspects.	  They	  are	  values	  or	  virtues	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  
transcend	  logic	  (or,	  at	  least,	  they	  defy	  a	  rigorous	  logical	  formulation).	  What	  Duhem	  saw	  
clearly	  was	  that	  the	  employment	  of	  such	  criteria	  is	  a)	  indispensable,	  and	  b)	  not	  algorithmic.	  
Their	  employment	  requires	  the	  exercise	  of	  judgement.	  The	  lesson	  we	  should	  draw	  from	  
Duhem	  is	  that	  judgement	  is	  part	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  scientific	  method.	  An	  extreme	  positivistic	  
understanding	  of	  scientific	  method,	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  fiction	  of	  Carnap’s	  robot,	  as	  a	  fully-­‐
determined-­‐by-­‐exact-­‐rules	  algorithmic	  process	  which	  delivers	  ‘yes-­‐no’	  answers	  (or	  exact	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degrees	  of	  confirmation)	  for	  each	  hypothesis	  formulated	  in	  a	  formal	  language,	  is	  not	  just	  a	  
chimera.	  It	  is,	  in	  addition,	  a	  model	  that	  does	  not	  bear	  any	  resemblance	  to	  whatever	  happens	  
in	  science.	  
If	  we	  are	  to	  stay	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  way	  science	  is	  practised,	  we	  should	  take	  it	  to	  heart	  
that	  scientific	  method	  is	  not	  algorithmic.	  It	  requires,	  and	  relies	  on,	  the	  exercise	  of	  
judgement.	  This	  judgement	  is	  constrained	  by	  evidence	  as	  well	  as	  by	  several	  virtues	  that	  
theories	  should	  possess.	  It	  can	  be	  rational	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  dictated	  by	  evidence	  plus	  logic.	  Its	  
rationality	  depends,	  ultimately,	  on	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  favour	  a	  certain	  option	  
and	  condemn	  another.	  	  
This	  need	  for	  an	  account	  of	  rational	  judgement	  which	  goes	  beyond	  experience-­‐plus-­‐logic	  
has	  been	  articulated	  by	  Ernan	  McMullin.	  As	  he	  aptly	  noted:	  “Values	  do	  not	  function	  in	  
assessment	  as	  rules	  do”	  (1996,	  19).	  It’s	  not	  just	  that	  different	  scientists	  may	  weigh	  different	  
values	  (or	  virtues)	  differently.	  This,	  as	  Kuhn	  has	  already	  noted,	  is	  true	  enough.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  
true	  that	  even	  if	  they	  are	  weighed	  similarly,	  they	  may	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other	  (say,	  
simplicity	  vs	  informativeness).	  Hence,	  judgement	  is	  required	  in	  balancing	  them	  out.	  No	  
recipe	  is	  there	  for	  choosing	  among	  competing	  theories.	  It	  would	  be	  too	  quick,	  however,	  to	  
conclude	  from	  this	  that	  these	  values	  have	  no	  rational	  force.	  This	  would	  amount	  to	  
intellectual	  paralysis.	  Take	  the	  prime	  empiricist	  virtue	  (and	  don’t	  forget	  that	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  
too):	  empirical	  fit.	  Of	  course,	  theories	  should	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  evidence	  (or	  entail	  it).	  
But	  judging	  empirical	  fit	  is	  no	  (much)	  less	  value-­‐laden	  than	  judging,	  say,	  explanatory	  fit.	  It’s	  
not	  just	  that	  many	  competing	  theories	  can	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  same	  observations.	  It’s	  
also	  that	  the	  very	  empirical	  fit	  of	  a	  theory	  to	  facts	  requires	  judgement:	  Which	  are	  the	  
relevant	  data?	  Which	  measurements	  are	  reliable?	  What	  error-­‐margins	  are	  allowed?	  etc.	  
	  
3 Social	  values	  in	  science	  
3.1	  Epistemic	  and	  social	  values	  
Thanks	  mostly	  to	  the	  work	  of	  feminist	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  has	  
been	  given	  to	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  science	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  The	  distinction	  
between	  epistemic	  values	  and	  social	  values	  is	  not	  sharp;14	  but	  there	  are	  paradigmatic	  cases	  
of	  epistemic	  values	  (that	  is,	  values	  which,	  at	  least	  under	  favourable	  circumstances,	  would	  be	  
related	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  theory’s	  being	  true)	  and	  social	  values	  (that	  is,	  values	  whose	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  distinction	  is	  non-­‐existent	  for	  social	  epistemologies,	  one	  anonymous	  reader	  remarked.	  But,	  to	  
the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  the	  feminist	  philosophers	  of	  science	  I	  know	  of	  do	  draw	  a	  distinction	  
between	  what	  is	  normally	  called	  ‘constitutive	  values’	  and	  ‘social	  values’.	  The	  distinction	  need	  not	  be	  
sharp	  to	  exist.	  For	  an	  in	  depth	  discussion,	  see	  Longino	  (1996).	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raison	  d’etre	  are	  social	  or	  ideological	  or	  moral	  or	  political	  considerations).15	  So	  simplicity,	  
coherence,	  explanatory	  power,	  novel	  predictive	  success	  are	  epistemic	  values;	  promoting	  the	  
welfare	  of	  humanity;	  creating	  equal	  opportunities;	  respecting	  the	  moral	  rights	  of	  individuals	  
are	  social	  values.	  Note	  that	  the	  last	  examples	  are	  examples	  of	  good	  social	  values.	  But,	  not	  all	  
social	  values	  are	  equally	  good;	  nor	  is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  a	  social	  
value	  is	  always	  written	  on	  its	  forehead,	  as	  it	  were.	  Nor,	  worse,	  is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  by	  calling	  a	  
social	  value	  ‘value’,	  it	  makes	  it	  inherently	  valuable.	  	  
	   In	  the	  case	  of	  epistemic	  values,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  prima	  facie	  argument	  why	  they	  are	  
important	  (actually,	  indispensable)	  in	  scientific	  inquiry.	  Not	  only	  do	  they	  constitute	  part	  and	  
parcel	  of	  ordinary	  scientific	  judgement	  and	  are	  involved	  in	  theory	  appraisal;	  but	  by	  being	  at	  
least	  in	  principle	  truth-­‐conducive,	  or	  by	  being	  truth-­‐conducive	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  
they	  affect	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  theory’s	  being	  true.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  or	  should	  be	  the	  role	  
of	  social	  values	  in	  science?	  After	  all,	  many	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  are	  still	  taken	  by	  the	  
value-­‐free	  ideal.16	  
An	  entry	  point	  for	  social	  values	  in	  science	  relates	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  underdetermination	  
we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.17	  Matthew	  Brown	  (2013)	  has	  codified	  two	  
relevant	  arguments.	  The	  first	  is	  “the	  gap	  argument”.	  Evidence	  underdetermines	  theory.	  Yet,	  
theory-­‐choice	  is	  not	  and	  should	  not	  be	  paralysed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  underdetermination.	  Hence,	  
social	  values	  ‘fill	  the	  gap’	  between	  evidence	  and	  theory	  and	  determine	  (or	  partially	  
determine)	  theory-­‐choice.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  variant	  of	  this	  argument,	  due	  to	  Justin	  Biddle	  (2013),	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  block	  
an	  immediate	  response	  to	  the	  ‘gap	  argument’.	  This	  response,	  explored	  already	  in	  section	  1,	  
is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  were	  to	  grant	  that	  evidence	  underdetermines	  theory,	  epistemic	  values	  can	  
be	  appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  break	  observational	  ties.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  epistemic	  values	  that	  can	  
and	  should	  determine	  theory-­‐choice.	  Biddle’s	  argument	  against	  this	  response	  is	  that	  an	  
appeal	  to	  epistemic	  values	  is	  not	  enough	  as	  a	  tie-­‐breaker	  since	  one	  set	  of	  epistemic	  values	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  same	  attentive	  reader	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  values	  “that	  may	  be	  placed	  on	  either	  side	  or	  in	  
between”.	  Examples	  offered	  are:	  “fecundity,	  being	  non-­‐anthropomorphic,	  reductionist,	  materialist”.	  
Though	  I	  agree	  that	  some	  values	  might	  be	  either	  hard	  to	  classify	  or	  Janus-­‐faced	  (e.g.,	  offering	  
mechanistic	  explanations),	  I	  would	  like	  to	  distinguish	  values	  (such	  as	  respecting	  human	  life)	  from	  
philosophical	  desiderata	  (like	  materialism),	  which	  however	  might	  themselves	  be	  subject	  to	  empirical	  
or	  theoretical	  investigation.	  See	  also	  Steel	  (2015,	  160ff).	  
16	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  value-­‐free	  ideal	  see	  Douglas	  (2009,	  60-­‐65).	  
17	  The	  locus	  classicus	  of	  this	  view	  is	  Lynn	  Hankinson	  Nelson	  (1996)	  and	  her	  naturalised	  Feminist	  
Account	  of	  Evidence	  (FAE).	  She	  has	  taken	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  evidence	  that	  is	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  
theories	  includes	  observations	  “and	  other	  theories	  that	  together	  constitute	  a	  current	  theory	  of	  
nature,	  inclusive	  of	  those	  informed	  by	  social	  beliefs	  and	  values”	  (1996,	  100).	  For	  a	  ‘state	  of	  the	  field’	  
account	  of	  the	  current	  debate	  see	  Biddle	  (2013)	  and	  the	  references	  therein.	  See	  also	  Steel	  (2010),	  
Carrier	  (2011)	  and	  Steele	  (2012).	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(or	  one	  assignment	  of	  weights	  to	  epistemic	  values)	  might	  favour	  one	  theory	  and	  another	  set	  
of	  epistemic	  values	  (or	  simply	  another	  assignment	  of	  weights	  to	  the	  same	  set	  of	  values)	  
might	  favour	  a	  rival	  theory.	  The	  conclusion	  Biddle	  draws	  is	  the	  social	  values	  might	  well	  
(actually,	  they	  should)	  be	  appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  break	  ties	  between	  competing	  sets	  of	  (or	  
competing	  weight	  assignments	  to)	  epistemic	  values.	  
The	  second	  argument	  for	  social	  values	  is	  “the	  error	  argument”.	  In	  broad	  outline,	  it	  is	  this.	  
Science	  can	  never	  yield	  certainty;	  hence,	  scientific	  theories	  can	  be	  erroneous	  despite	  the	  
evidential	  support	  they	  might	  enjoy.	  Yet,	  theories	  are	  nonetheless	  accepted	  or	  rejected	  and	  
judgements	  of	  acceptance	  or	  rejection	  are	  dependent	  on	  decisions	  about	  how	  serious	  an	  
error	  it	  is	  to	  accept	  a	  theory	  if	  it	  is	  false	  or	  to	  reject	  it	  if	  it	  true.	  These	  latter	  judgements	  are	  
amenable	  to	  ethical	  and	  social	  considerations.	  Hence,	  theory	  acceptance	  in	  science	  is	  subject	  
to	  social	  values.18	  	  
Both	  arguments	  share	  an	  assumption	  that	  was	  challenged	  in	  section	  2,	  viz.,	  that	  
underdetermination	  is	  rampant	  and	  that	  evidential	  considerations	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  break	  
occasional	  observational	  ties.	  If	  cases	  of	  underdetermination	  are	  not	  so	  pervasive,	  or	  if	  
standard	  appeals	  to	  evidence	  break	  observational	  ties,	  then	  the	  appeal	  to	  social	  values	  to	  
address	  this	  problem	  is	  not	  so	  urgent.	  Yet,	  even	  if	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  solving	  
observational	  ties	  is	  not	  as	  prominent	  as	  it	  has	  been	  supposed	  by	  the	  foregoing	  arguments,	  
it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  values	  do	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  
science.	  To	  put	  it	  bluntly,	  social	  values	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  science	  because	  a)	  scientists	  
are	  socially	  situated	  beings;	  b)	  scientific	  research	  has	  important	  social	  implications	  (and	  
sometimes,	  presuppositions)	  which	  are	  potentially	  and	  actually	  exploitable	  by	  social	  groups.	  
So	  the	  point	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values,	  but	  to	  examine	  how	  they	  function	  and	  
why.	  This	  is	  the	  lasting	  lesson	  of	  feminist	  epistemology	  of	  science.	  
	   One	  way	  to	  defend	  the	  ineliminability	  of	  social	  values	  has	  been	  to	  re-­‐locate	  their	  function	  
from	  the	  level	  of	  theory-­‐choice	  to	  the	  adjacent	  stage	  of	  decision	  making	  and	  policy-­‐making.	  
The	  claim	  is	  that	  though	  social	  values	  do	  not	  offer	  evidential	  reasons	  to	  believe	  a	  theory,	  
they	  do	  (and	  should)	  guide	  decisions	  about	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  uncertainty	  associated	  with	  a	  
theory	  and	  how	  to	  employ	  the	  theory.	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	  values	  
is	  that	  if	  social	  values	  are	  taken	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  theory	  acceptance	  itself	  (and	  hence	  in	  the	  
reasons	  to	  believe	  a	  theory),	  the	  objectivity	  of	  science	  might	  be	  threatened.	  Heather	  
Douglas,	  who	  has	  done	  some	  pioneering	  work	  in	  this	  area,	  stresses	  that	  social	  values	  
(should)	  play	  an	  indirect	  role	  in	  theory-­‐choice	  by	  acting	  as	  reasons	  to	  accept	  a	  certain	  level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Steel	  (2015,	  146-­‐149)	  has	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  this	  argument.	  Brigandt	  (2015)	  offers	  a	  critical	  
assessment	  of	  the	  inductive	  risk	  approach.	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of	  uncertainty.	  As	  she	  (2009,	  87)	  characteristically	  puts	  it:	  “Values	  are	  not	  evidence;	  wishing	  
does	  not	  make	  it	  so.	  There	  must	  be	  some	  important	  limits	  to	  the	  roles	  values	  play	  in	  
science”.19	  
	  
3.2	  Objectivity	  vs	  neutrality	  
I	  would	  be	  the	  last	  to	  deny	  that	  objectivity	  is	  important	  and	  that	  it	  makes	  science	  distinctive	  
as	  a	  cognitive	  enterprise.	  Objectivity	  is	  hard	  to	  define	  precisely.	  I	  take	  it	  to	  stand	  for	  
whatever	  is	  independent	  of	  particular	  points	  of	  view,	  perspectives,	  subjective	  states	  and	  
preferences.	  It	  then	  follows	  that	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  senses	  of	  objectivity,	  depending	  on	  
how	  exactly	  we	  understand	  the	  demand	  of	  independence.	  The	  first	  sense	  is	  inter-­‐
subjectivity,	  understood	  as	  the	  ‘common	  factor’	  point	  of	  view:	  the	  point	  of	  view	  common	  to	  
all	  subjects.	  Thus	  understood,	  objectivity	  amounts	  to	  inter-­‐subjective	  agreement.	  The	  
second	  sense	  is	  radical	  objectivity:	  objective	  is	  whatever	  is	  totally	  subject-­‐independent;	  what	  
belongs	  to	  the	  world	  and	  not	  the	  knowing	  subject.20	  Inter-­‐subjectivity	  can	  be	  profitably	  
understood	  as	  being	  connected	  with	  invariance:	  objective	  is	  whatever	  remains	  invariant	  
under	  transformations,	  or	  under	  change	  of	  perspective	  or	  point	  of	  view.	  Radical	  objectivity	  
might	  be	  profitably	  understood	  as	  commitment	  to	  view	  that	  there	  is	  a	  worldly	  fact	  of	  the	  
matter	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  theory	  or	  a	  belief	  is	  true	  or	  false	  and	  that	  this	  is	  independent	  of	  our	  
knowledge	  of	  it.	  The	  quest	  for	  objectivity	  is	  a	  quest	  for	  grounding	  our	  beliefs	  about	  the	  
world	  to	  the	  world.	  As	  Sandra	  Harding	  (1993,	  92)	  has	  nicely	  put	  it:	  “The	  notion	  of	  objectivity	  
is	  useful	  in	  providing	  a	  way	  to	  think	  about	  the	  gap	  that	  should	  exist	  about	  how	  any	  individual	  
or	  group	  wants	  the	  world	  to	  be	  and	  how	  in	  fact	  it	  is”.	  
	   One	  important	  lesson	  that	  standpoint	  epistemologies	  have	  taught	  us	  is	  that	  the	  demand	  
for	  objectivity	  should	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  demand	  for	  neutrality	  (or	  disinterestedness)	  
and	  that	  situated	  knowledge	  (and	  in	  particular	  knowledge	  that	  starts	  from	  the	  lives	  and	  
needs	  of	  marginalized	  subjects)	  can	  be	  objective	  (see	  Goldenberg	  2015).	  Objectivity	  does	  
not	  imply	  neutrality	  or	  value-­‐freedom.	  Our	  previous	  discussion	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Douglas	  (2009,	  96)	  has	  distinguished	  between	  two	  roles	  values	  can	  play	  in	  science.	  They	  play	  a	  
direct	  role	  when	  they	  “act	  as	  reasons	  in	  themselves	  to	  accept	  a	  claim,	  providing	  a	  direct	  motivation	  
for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  theory”.	  But	  values	  play	  an	  indirect	  role	  when	  they	  are	  used	  “to	  weigh	  the	  
importance	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  claim,	  helping	  to	  decide	  what	  should	  count	  as	  sufficient	  evidence	  
for	  the	  claim”	  (ibid.).	  Her	  key	  claim	  is	  that	  though	  the	  indirect	  use	  of	  values	  is	  fine,	  values	  should	  be	  
used	  in	  a	  direct	  way	  only	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  influencing	  the	  choice	  of	  scientific	  projects.	  More	  
specifically,	  direct	  appeal	  to	  values	  should	  be	  disallowed	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  rejecting	  or	  accepting	  
hypotheses,	  or	  to	  assessing	  the	  evidence,	  or	  to	  the	  designing	  of	  experiments	  and	  the	  like.	  For	  a	  
criticism	  of	  the	  Douglas’	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  roles	  see	  Brigandt	  (2015).	  	  
20	  When,	  for	  instance,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  certain	  entities	  have	  objective	  existence,	  it	  is	  meant	  that	  they	  
exist	  independently	  of	  being	  perceived,	  or	  known	  etc.	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underdetermination	  has	  shown	  that	  objectivity	  does	  not	  require	  an	  impossible	  algorithmic	  
account	  of	  how	  evidence	  bears	  on	  theory.	  In	  fact,	  values	  influence	  the	  evidential	  judgements	  
of	  scientists	  and	  play	  a	  role	  in	  filling	  the	  gap	  between	  evidence	  and	  theory.	  Conversely,	  
evidence	  influences	  the	  value	  judgements	  of	  scientists	  and	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  adjusting	  and	  
refining	  values.	  So	  evidence	  and	  values	  are	  in	  reflective	  equilibrium	  and	  mutual	  adjustment.	  
Values	  and	  evidence	  get	  into	  the	  scientific	  inquiry	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  they	  presuppose	  
each	  other.	  This	  interplay	  is	  constitutive	  of	  scientific	  enquiry.	  Here	  is	  a	  case	  which	  illustrates	  
this	  point.	  	  
Isaac	  Newton’s	  methodological	  rules	  (“rules	  of	  reasoning	  in	  philosophy”)	  are	  rules	  of	  how	  
evidence	  should	  be	  used	  and	  assessed.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  embody	  values.	  Take	  the	  
famous	  rule	  IV:	  
	  
In	  experimental	  philosophy	  we	  are	  to	  look	  upon	  propositions	  inferred	  by	  general	  induction	  
from	  phenomena	  as	  accurately	  or	  very	  nearly	  true,	  notwithstanding	  any	  contrary	  hypotheses	  
that	  may	  be	  imagined,	  till	  such	  time	  as	  other	  phenomena	  occur,	  by	  which	  they	  may	  either	  be	  
made	  more	  accurate,	  or	  liable	  to	  exceptions	  (2004,	  89).	  
	  
In	  this	  very	  rule,	  values	  play	  a	  prominent	  role.	  Newton	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  proposition	  
which	  has	  been	  inductively	  established	  has	  to	  be	  adhered	  to	  disregarding	  alternative	  
hypotheses—but	  this	  last	  requirement	  is	  a	  value;	  not	  statement	  of	  fact.	  Accuracy	  is	  a	  value	  
too.	  By	  disregarding	  alternatives	  until	  more	  accuracy	  is	  needed	  or	  recalcitrant	  evidence	  is	  
found,	  the	  accepted	  proposition	  does	  not,	  obviously,	  become	  wishful	  thinking.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  
the	  product	  on	  induction	  and	  hence	  it	  is	  supported	  by	  various	  natural	  phenomena.	  But,	  in	  
Newton’s	  case,	  these	  are	  epistemic	  values.	  	  
Can	  we	  run	  a	  similar	  argument	  for	  social	  values?	  I	  think	  we	  can	  provided	  we	  exercise	  
some	  caution.	  The	  caution	  is	  needed	  because	  there	  is	  some	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  suspicion	  
about	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  science.	  Elizabeth	  Potter	  (2006,	  76)	  sums	  up	  (without	  
endorsing)	  the	  suspicion	  as	  follows:	  “Scientists	  use	  either	  facts	  or	  values	  to	  guide	  research;	  
but	  not	  both.	  At	  best,	  contextual	  values	  (moral,	  social,	  or	  political	  values	  and	  interests)	  
displace	  attention	  to	  evidence	  and	  valid	  reasoning;	  at	  worst,	  they	  lead	  scientists	  to	  bias,	  
wishful	  thinking,	  dogmatism,	  dishonesty,	  and	  totalitarianism”.	  The	  image	  of	  value-­‐neutrality	  
of	  science	  had	  gained	  plausibility	  by	  being	  contrasted	  to	  an	  image	  of	  social	  and	  political	  
interest-­‐driven	  science	  which	  generates	  bias,	  dogmatism,	  dishonesty	  etc.	  But	  feminist	  
critiques	  of	  science	  have	  made	  a	  case	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  science	  is	  not	  value-­‐neutral	  and,	  
more	  importantly,	  that	  value-­‐neutrality	  is	  the	  wrong	  image	  of	  science.	  The	  real	  issue,	  as	  I	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think	  Elizabeth	  Anderson	  has	  stressed,	  is	  not	  value-­‐neutrality,	  but	  impartiality,	  which	  is	  
achieved	  by	  “a	  commitment	  to	  pass	  judgment	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  set	  of	  evaluative	  standards	  
that	  transcends	  the	  competing	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  advocate	  rival	  answers	  to	  a	  question.”	  
Evaluative	  standards	  are	  not	  value-­‐free	  (they	  would	  not	  be	  evaluative	  if	  they	  were)	  but	  they	  
require	  fairness,	  that	  is	  “attention	  to	  all	  the	  facts	  and	  arguments	  that	  support	  or	  undermine	  
each	  side’s	  value	  judgments”	  (Anderson	  1995,	  42).	  	  
	   The	  caution	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  social	  values	  is	  needed	  not	  because	  social	  values	  jeopardise	  
the	  made-­‐up	  image	  of	  value-­‐free	  science	  but	  because	  social	  values	  are,	  ultimately,	  socially	  
determined	  values,	  typically	  motivated	  by	  political,	  ideological	  and	  class	  (and	  not	  obviously	  
epistemic)	  interests.	  But	  then	  the	  question	  arises:	  what	  and	  whose	  social	  values?	  This	  
question	  has	  been	  raised	  by	  various	  radical	  feminist	  and	  Marxist	  philosophers	  of	  science	  and	  
it	  is	  precisely	  this	  issue	  that	  needs	  appreciation.	  Anderson	  put	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  values	  that	  are	  
epistemically	  fruitful;	  that	  is	  social	  values	  that	  guide	  research	  “toward	  discovering	  a	  wider	  
range	  of	  evidence	  that	  could	  potentially	  support	  any	  (or	  more)	  sides	  of	  a	  controversy.”	  
(quoted	  by	  Potter	  2006,	  91).	  	  
I	  think	  the	  critics	  of	  the	  view	  of	  the	  social	  value-­‐ladenness	  of	  scientific	  judgement	  are	  
right	  in	  stressing	  that	  social	  values	  might	  jeopardise	  rather	  than	  promote	  the	  objectivity	  of	  
science.	  But	  they	  are	  right	  in	  this	  suspicion	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  do	  not	  take	  into	  
account	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  social	  values	  they	  are.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  key	  issue	  is	  not	  
whether	  scientific	  judgement	  is	  value-­‐laden	  but	  rather	  what	  kind	  of	  values	  it	  is	  laden	  with:	  
what	  kind	  of	  social	  values	  are	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  values.	  But	  who	  is	  going	  to	  decide	  what	  are	  
the	  right	  kind	  of	  social	  values	  and	  what	  not?	  Here	  again	  we	  can	  learn	  a	  lot	  from	  feminist	  
epistemology.21	  
Before	  I	  attempt	  to	  address	  this	  key	  issue,	  let	  me	  examine	  briefly	  a	  case	  in	  which	  social	  
values	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  methodological	  principle	  of	  conduct	  of	  scientific	  inquiry.	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  attentive	  reviewer	  noted	  that	  this	  point	  has	  been	  raised	  by	  Louise	  Antony	  in	  her	  (2003).	  The	  
importance,	  I	  think,	  of	  Antony’s	  approach	  lies	  in	  her	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  feminist	  epistemology	  must	  
face	  the	  normative	  issue	  of	  what	  makes	  some	  processes	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  better	  than	  others.	  
Antony	  rightly	  argued	  that	  feminist	  epistemology	  faces	  a	  “bias	  paradox”:	  “Either	  endorse	  pure	  
impartiality	  or	  give	  up	  criticizing	  bias”	  (2003,	  102).	  Her	  way	  out	  was	  to	  distinguish	  between	  good	  bias	  
and	  bad	  bias	  and	  to	  argue	  that	  ordinary	  naturalised	  epistemology	  is	  good	  at	  pointing	  out	  that	  all	  
cognitive	  inquiries	  have	  presuppositions;	  hence	  they	  are	  biased	  in	  various	  ways.	  The	  issue,	  then,	  is	  not	  
(the	  impossible	  task)	  to	  eliminate	  bias	  altogether	  but	  rather	  to	  “treat	  the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  
particular	  biases	  as	  an	  empirical	  question”	  (2003,	  137).	  In	  her	  account	  “One	  important	  strategy	  for	  
telling	  the	  difference	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  biases	  is	  thus	  to	  evaluate	  the	  overall	  theories	  in	  which	  
the	  biases	  figure”	  (2003,	  137).	  In	  a	  Quinean	  framework,	  this	  strategy	  is	  possible	  because	  in	  it	  values	  
and	  facts	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  our	  theories	  of	  the	  world.	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  Antony’s	  challenge	  to	  
feminist	  epistemology,	  though	  I	  endorse	  the	  perspective	  of	  standpoint	  epistemologies	  and	  I	  will	  try	  to	  
address	  the	  issue	  of	  normativity	  in	  a	  different	  way.	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is	  the	  so-­‐called	  Precautionary	  Principle	  (PP).22	  PP	  is	  supposed	  to	  kick	  in	  when,	  even	  though	  
there	  is	  scientific	  evidence	  for	  harm	  to	  health	  and/or	  the	  environment,	  the	  evidence	  is	  not	  
yet	  conclusive.	  Here	  is	  how	  PP	  is	  typically	  stated	  (working	  definition)23:	  
	  
When	  human	  activities	  may	  lead	  to	  morally	  unacceptable	  harm	  that	  is	  scientifically	  
plausible	  but	  uncertain,	  actions	  shall	  be	  taken	  to	  avoid	  or	  diminish	  that	  harm.	  
Morally	  unacceptable	  harm	  refers	  to	  harm	  to	  humans	  or	  the	  environment	  that	  is	  
• threatening	  to	  human	  life	  or	  health,	  or	  
• serious	  and	  effectively	  irreversible,	  or	  
• inequitable	  to	  present	  or	  future	  generations,	  or	  
• imposed	  without	  adequate	  consideration	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  those	  affected.	  
The	  judgement	  of	  plausibility	  should	  be	  grounded	  in	  scientific	  analysis.	  Analysis	  
should	  be	  ongoing	  so	  that	  chosen	  actions	  are	  subject	  to	  review.	  Uncertainty	  may	  apply	  to,	  but	  
need	  not	  be	  limited	  to,	  causality	  or	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  possible	  harm.	  Actions	  are	  interventions	  
that	  are	  undertaken	  before	  harm	  occurs	  that	  seek	  to	  avoid	  or	  diminish	  the	  harm.	  Actions	  
should	  be	  chosen	  that	  are	  proportional	  to	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  potential	  harm,	  with	  
consideration	  of	  their	  positive	  and	  negative	  consequences,	  and	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  
moral	  implications	  of	  both	  action	  and	  inaction.	  The	  choice	  of	  action	  should	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
participatory	  process.	  
	  
There	  is	  considerable	  debate	  about	  this	  principle,	  which	  suggests	  a	  strategy	  to	  cope	  with	  
possible	  risks	  where	  scientific	  evidence	  is	  strong	  but	  not	  yet	  conclusive.24	  Here,	  I	  want	  to	  
focus	  on	  just	  on	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  principle,	  viz.,	  that	  it	  embodies	  social	  values.	  The	  very	  idea	  
of	  ‘morally	  unacceptable	  harm’	  to	  humans	  and	  to	  the	  environment	  captures	  a	  set	  of	  social	  
values,	  the	  key	  element	  of	  which	  is	  that	  human	  life	  and	  environmental	  health	  (so	  to	  speak)	  
are	  intrinsically	  valuable	  and	  should	  take	  precedent	  over	  other	  possible	  social	  values.	  What	  
is	  important	  about	  PP	  is	  that	  it	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  principle	  only	  if	  the	  very	  social	  values	  
that	  are	  embodied	  in	  it	  take	  precedent	  over	  other	  social	  values	  (e.g.	  economic	  interests,	  
profit	  etc).	  Pretty	  much	  as	  Newton’s	  fourth	  rule	  above	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  rule	  only	  if	  the	  
epistemic	  values	  that	  are	  embodied	  in	  it	  take	  precedent	  oven	  other	  epistemic	  values.	  
There	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  in	  which	  we	  can	  think	  of	  the	  possible	  application	  of	  PP—the	  
case	  of	  mesothelioma,	  a	  fatal	  disease	  with	  a	  very	  long	  incubation	  time,	  which	  once	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Steel’s	  (2015)	  is	  an	  impressive	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  PP.	  
23	  This	  is	  taken	  from	  The	  Precautionary	  Principle,	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Scientific	  
Knowledge	  and	  Technology,	  UNESCO,	  2005,	  p.14.	  	  
24	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  Peter	  Saunders	  (2010).	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manifested,	  it	  is	  normally	  fatal	  within	  one	  year.25	  It	  is	  now	  widely	  acknowledged	  by	  scientists	  
that	  asbestos	  is	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  this	  disease.	  It	  is	  reported	  by	  health	  experts	  that	  some	  
250,000	  –	  400,000	  deaths	  from	  mesothelioma,	  lung	  cancer,	  and	  asbestosis	  will	  occur	  over	  
the	  next	  few	  decades	  in	  the	  EU	  countries	  only,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  exposure	  to	  asbestos	  in	  
the	  past.	  The	  story	  is	  that	  though	  there	  was	  strong	  evidence	  which	  linked	  asbestos	  to	  lung	  
cancer	  and	  other	  harmful	  effects,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  evidence	  was	  not	  compelling	  
“contributed	  to	  the	  long	  delay	  before	  action	  was	  taken	  and	  risk	  reduction	  regulation	  was	  put	  
in	  place”.	  The	  evidence	  of	  harmful	  effects	  of	  asbestos	  was	  there	  in	  the	  middle	  sixties	  but	  it	  
was	  only	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  that	  EU	  banned	  all	  forms	  of	  asbestos.	  As	  is	  stated	  in	  the	  report	  on	  
PP	  by	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Scientific	  Knowledge	  and	  Technology	  (p.11),	  	  
	  
A	  Dutch	  study	  has	  estimated	  that	  a	  ban	  in	  1965,	  when	  the	  mesothelioma	  hypothesis	  was	  
plausible	  but	  unproven,	  instead	  of	  in	  1993	  when	  the	  hazard	  of	  asbestos	  was	  widely	  
acknowledged,	  would	  have	  saved	  the	  country	  some	  34,000	  victims	  and	  Euro	  19	  billion	  in	  
building	  costs	  (clean	  up)	  and	  compensation	  costs.	  
	  
This	  suggests	  to	  me	  that	  there	  can	  be	  evidence	  for	  a	  principle	  such	  as	  PP,	  that	  is	  evidence	  
that	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	  making	  it	  a	  generally	  accepted	  principle,	  even	  if	  social	  values	  are	  
involved	  in	  it.	  So	  the	  choice	  of	  principles	  such	  as	  PP	  can	  be	  based	  on	  evidence.	  But	  I	  doubt	  
that	  there	  can	  be	  (direct)	  evidence	  for	  the	  social	  values	  themselves	  (see	  also	  Goldenberg	  
2015).	  Their	  choice	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  evidence;	  let	  alone	  of	  an	  instrumental	  justification.	  
Their	  choice	  or	  adoption	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  way	  we	  conceive	  ourselves	  as	  human	  beings	  and	  
the	  moral	  and	  social	  implications	  of	  our	  conceptions.	  Resistance	  to	  PP,	  I	  claim,	  is	  based,	  at	  
least	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  on	  a	  different	  set	  of	  social	  values,	  where,	  for	  instance,	  possible	  harm	  
to	  the	  environment	  is	  traded	  off	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  profit.	  	  
	  
3.3 Standpoints	  and	  values	  
Let	  me	  finally	  address	  the	  key	  question	  I	  raised	  above:	  who	  is	  going	  to	  decide	  what	  are	  the	  
right	  kind	  of	  social	  values	  and	  what	  not?	  Raising	  this	  kind	  of	  question	  implies	  that	  the	  
required	  account	  of	  objectivity	  should	  be	  social	  in	  the	  way	  Longino	  (2002)	  has	  described	  it	  so	  
that	  the	  social	  and	  moral	  values	  that	  are	  implicated	  in	  science	  can	  be	  made	  explicit	  and	  
subjected	  to	  criticism.	  This	  is	  required	  for	  the	  process	  of	  “social	  value	  management”	  to	  be	  in	  
principle	  possible.	  But	  though	  this	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  creating	  a	  framework	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  I	  have	  based	  this	  on	  the	  facts	  presented	  in	  The	  Precautionary	  Principle,	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  
Ethics	  of	  Scientific	  Knowledge	  and	  Technology,	  UNESCO,	  2005.	  The	  quotation	  is	  from	  p.11.	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which	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  is	  raised	  and	  discussed,	  it	  might	  not	  be	  normative	  enough	  to	  
allow	  judgements	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  values	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  implicated	  in,	  or	  excluded	  from,	  
scientific	  research.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  what	  Janet	  Kourany	  (2010)	  has	  aptly	  called	  “socially	  
responsible	  science”	  which	  encourages	  inclusion	  of	  social	  values	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  
human	  flourishing,	  promote	  equality	  and	  social	  justice	  and,	  generally,	  contribute	  to	  the	  
making	  of	  a	  good	  society.	  Kourany	  is	  fully	  aware	  that	  this	  issue	  is	  deeply	  political.	  As	  she	  
(2010,	  106)	  puts	  it:	  	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  political	  approach	  (...)	  sound	  social	  values	  as	  well	  as	  sound	  epistemic	  values	  
must	  control	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  scientific	  research	  process,	  from	  the	  choice	  of	  research	  
questions	  to	  the	  communication	  and	  application	  of	  results,	  this	  to	  be	  enforced	  by	  such	  political	  
means	  as	  funding	  requirements	  on	  research.	  
	  
This	  move	  towards	  politics	  highlights	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  right	  kinds	  of	  values	  is	  not,	  
and	  cannot	  be,	  neutral.	  Social	  values	  depend	  on	  ideological,	  political	  and	  moral	  stances	  
(explicitly	  or	  implicitly)	  and	  these	  stances	  are	  typically	  determined	  by	  social,	  political	  and	  
class	  interests.	  The	  right	  kind	  of	  values,	  those	  which	  promote	  human	  flourishing,	  may	  well	  
be	  perspectival	  values,	  that	  is	  values	  associated	  most	  typically	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  certain	  
social	  groups.	  Still,	  there	  must	  be	  ways	  to	  show	  how	  otherwise	  perspectival	  social	  values	  
can,	  in	  principle,	  become	  universal,	  that	  is	  values	  that	  could	  and	  should	  be	  adopted	  and	  
guide	  the	  action	  of	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  of	  social	  groups	  whose	  initial	  
perspective	  (or	  interests)	  might	  have	  led	  them	  to	  adopt	  different	  values.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  this	  is	  
a	  point	  advanced	  by	  feminist	  standpoint	  epistemologies	  and	  also	  by	  Marxist	  theories	  of	  
social	  emancipation.	  	  
Standpoint	  epistemologies	  have	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  two	  things.	  One	  is	  to	  make	  a	  strong	  
case	  for	  the	  claim	  all	  knowledge	  is	  socially	  situated	  and	  that	  some	  “objective	  social	  locations	  
are	  better	  than	  others	  as	  starting	  points	  for	  knowledge	  projects”	  (Harding	  1993,	  56).	  Starting	  
from	  these	  objective	  social	  locations	  (most	  typically	  the	  marginalised	  social	  groups	  and	  their	  
lives)	  will	  generate	  various	  critical	  questions	  and	  projects	  that	  would	  lie	  hidden	  if	  we	  were	  to	  
start	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  socially	  dominant	  groups.	  The	  other	  thing,	  however,	  is	  to	  avoid	  
relativism	  and	  ethnocentrism.	  That	  is,	  to	  avoid	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  certain	  social	  location	  is	  
inherently	  superior	  over	  the	  others	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  not	  to	  fall	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  
social	  locations	  are	  equally	  good	  starting	  points.	  Harding’s	  ‘strong	  objectivity’	  has	  honoured	  
both	  of	  these	  things	  by	  making	  the	  very	  standpoint	  from	  which	  knowledge	  is	  gained	  to	  be	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the	  subject	  of	  critical	  theoretical	  analysis	  and	  study.	  This	  is	  what	  Harding	  has	  called	  ‘strong	  
reflexivity’.	  	  
	  	   Advocates	  of	  standpoint	  epistemologies	  (notably	  Harding	  1993)	  have	  contrasted	  their	  
views	  to	  universalism.	  But	  they	  have	  taken	  universalism	  to	  require	  a	  value-­‐free	  
“transcendental	  standard	  for	  deciding	  between	  competing	  knowledge	  claims”	  (Harding	  
1993,	  61)	  or	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  view-­‐from-­‐nowhere	  (1993,	  58),	  or	  to	  demand	  a	  value-­‐free	  
objectivity	  (1993,	  73).	  I	  too	  think	  this	  kind	  of	  universalism	  is	  absurd.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  
alternative.	  	  
To	  see	  that	  it	  is	  not,	  let	  me	  note	  that	  a	  key	  attraction	  of	  standpoint	  epistemologies	  (of	  the	  
feminist	  standpoint	  in	  particular)	  is	  that	  the	  good	  epistemic	  practices	  that	  are	  unearthed	  by	  
examining	  science	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  marginalised	  groups	  are	  not	  good	  
epistemic	  practices	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  only	  (or	  from	  those	  who	  occupy	  the	  
relevant	  standpoint)	  but	  for	  everyone.	  Harding	  (1993,	  54)	  says:	  	  
	  
(T)he	  activities	  of	  those	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  such	  social	  hierarchies	  can	  provide	  starting	  points	  for	  
thought—for	  everyone’s	  research	  and	  scholarship—from	  which	  humans’	  relations	  with	  each	  
other	  and	  the	  natural	  world	  can	  become	  visible.	  	  
	  
And	  later	  on	  she	  says	  that	  feminist	  standpoint	  theorists	  “want	  results	  of	  research	  that	  are	  
not	  ‘loyal	  to	  gender’—	  feminine	  or	  masculine	  (1993,	  72).	  As	  she	  explains:	  “Standpoint	  
approaches	  want	  to	  eliminate	  dominant	  group	  interests	  and	  values	  from	  the	  results	  of	  
research	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interests	  and	  values	  of	  successfully	  colonized	  minorities—loyalty	  to	  
femininity	  as	  well	  as	  masculinity	  is	  to	  be	  eliminated	  through	  feminist	  research	  (1993,	  74).	  To	  
eliminate	  ‘loyalty-­‐to-­‐gender’	  values	  is	  not	  to	  endorse	  value-­‐neutrality,	  as	  Harding	  rightly	  
notes.	  But	  it	  is,	  I	  claim,	  to	  argue	  that	  some	  values	  are	  not	  universalisable;	  they	  cannot	  
transcend	  the	  perspective	  from	  within	  which	  they	  arise.	  Conversely,	  the	  right	  values	  are	  
those	  that	  can	  be	  shared;	  that	  they	  can	  be	  adopted	  (ideally)	  by	  everyone	  (as	  the	  first	  
quotation	  by	  Harding	  in	  this	  paragraph	  suggests).	  
So,	  universalisability	  of	  values	  is	  my	  alternative.	  And	  this	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  
kind	  of	  universalism	  that	  Harding	  argues	  against.	  To	  explain	  my	  point,	  I	  want	  to	  go	  back	  to	  
the	  origins	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  standpoint	  epistemology.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  
standpoint	  goes	  back	  to	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  to	  Georg	  Lukacs’s	  (1923)	  appropriation	  of	  the	  
Marxian	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘standpoint	  of	  the	  proletariat’.	  When	  Marx	  famously	  called	  the	  
proletariat	  the	  “universal	  class”	  he	  did	  not,	  obviously,	  mean	  that	  everyone	  is	  a	  proletarian.	  
He	  meant	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  proletariat	  (ultimately,	  human	  emancipation	  by	  the	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abolition	  of	  exploitation)	  were	  universal	  interests;	  that	  is	  interests	  that	  could	  become	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (and	  of	  other	  social	  groups	  and	  classes	  in	  particular).	  So	  
the	  interests	  of	  a	  particular	  class	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be(come)	  universal	  interests.	  As	  Marx	  
put	  it	  in	  his	  1844	  Economic	  and	  Philosophical	  Writings	  “the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  workers	  
contains	  universal	  human	  emancipation”	  (Marx	  1975,	  280).	  In	  emancipating	  itself,	  a	  
universal	  class	  emancipates	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Self-­‐interest	  becomes	  then	  universal	  
interest.26	  
In	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  1883	  German	  edition	  of	  the	  Communist	  Manifesto,	  Engels	  noted	  
that	  the	  basic	  thought	  that	  “belongs	  solely	  and	  exclusively	  to	  Marx”	  was	  that	  “the	  exploited	  
and	  oppressed	  class	  (the	  proletariat)	  can	  no	  longer	  emancipate	  itself	  from	  the	  class	  which	  
exploits	  and	  oppresses	  it	  (the	  bourgeoisie),	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  forever	  freeing	  the	  
whole	  of	  society	  from	  exploitation,	  oppression,	  class	  struggles”	  (Marx	  and	  Engels	  2002,	  197).	  
This	  is	  precisely	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  proletariat	  are	  universal	  interests:	  
their	  satisfaction	  requires	  and	  entails	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  society	  as	  a	  
whole.	  My	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  defend	  the	  proletariat	  as	  the	  universal	  class;	  nor	  to	  prioritise	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  proletariat	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  oppressed	  groups.	  My	  point	  is	  merely	  that	  it	  is	  part	  
of	  the	  original	  standpoint	  theory—the	  Marxian	  one—that	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  particular	  
social	  group	  or	  class	  can	  become	  a	  universal	  standpoint,	  that	  is	  a	  standpoint	  which	  can	  and	  
should	  be	  occupied	  by	  other	  classes	  or	  groups.	  The	  distinctive	  element	  of	  this	  approach,	  and	  
the	  one	  I	  would	  like	  to	  stress,	  is	  that	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  class	  (or	  a	  social	  group)	  can	  be	  
detached	  from	  the	  specific	  class-­‐	  or	  group-­‐interests	  that	  motivated	  and	  justified	  its	  
occupation	  and	  to	  become	  the	  standpoint	  of	  universal	  human	  interests.27	  The	  
universalisability	  of	  social	  values	  is,	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  at	  least,	  their	  objectivity.	  This	  is	  
fully	  consistent	  with	  standpoint	  epistemologies,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  standpoint	  (and	  hence	  
the	  values)	  of	  a	  certain	  socially	  identified	  group	  aims	  to	  become	  the	  universal	  standpoint	  
from	  which	  society	  and	  its	  structure	  and	  values	  are	  viewed.28	  
	  
4. The	  evidence	  debate	  in	  Canada	  
How	  can	  the	  perspective	  adopted	  above	  cast	  some	  light	  on	  the	  ‘death	  of	  evidence’	  debate	  in	  
Canada?	  Here	  are	  some	  facts,	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  press	  and	  various	  blogs.	  Scientists	  working	  
for	  the	  Government	  are	  required	  to	  obtain	  permission	  by	  high-­‐level	  civil	  servants	  to	  discuss	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  In	  this	  reading	  of	  Marx	  I	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Llorrente	  (2013).	  	  
27	  That’s	  an	  ideal,	  of	  course.	  In	  practice,	  it	  is	  enough	  that	  perspectival	  values	  become	  multi-­‐
perspectival,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  social	  groups	  that	  resist	  them.	  	  
28	  For	  some	  similar	  thoughts,	  see	  Railton	  (1984).	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research	  findings	  with	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public.	  This	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  “muzzling	  of	  
scientists”.	  Some	  important	  research	  institutions	  have	  been	  eliminated	  or	  scaled	  down,	  
thereby	  eliminating	  sources	  of	  data	  and	  scientific	  evidence,	  especially	  related	  to	  
environmental	  and	  climate	  issues.	  The	  Omnibus	  Budget	  Bill	  C-­‐38	  (in	  June	  2012)	  cut	  funding	  
or	  dismantled	  a	  number	  of	  environmental	  bodies	  or	  bills.29	  	  
The	  evidence	  that	  the	  Harper	  Administration	  is	  at	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  ‘war	  with	  
science’	  is	  quite	  significant.	  It	  is	  so	  significant	  that	  the	  journal	  Nature	  dedicated	  two	  
editorials	  to	  this	  topic	  in	  the	  space	  of	  four	  years.	  The	  first	  in	  21	  February	  2008	  was	  titled	  
‘Science	  in	  retreat:	  Canada	  has	  been	  scientifically	  healthy.	  Not	  so	  its	  government”.	  The	  
second,	  in	  19	  July	  2012,	  was	  titled	  ‘The	  death	  of	  evidence’.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  more	  
recently	  (in	  September	  21,	  2013)	  had	  one	  of	  their	  own	  editorials	  devoted	  to	  this	  issue.	  Its	  
title	  was	  “Silencing	  Scientists”.	  More	  importantly,	  scientists	  themselves	  have	  taken	  action	  
against	  the	  trend	  to	  silence	  evidence,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  by	  rallying	  at	  the	  
Parliament	  Hill	  in	  Ottawa	  in	  July	  10	  2012	  and	  by	  marching	  in	  17	  cities	  around	  Canada	  on	  
September	  16	  2013.30	  
	   What	  is	  at	  stake	  here?	  As	  the	  2012	  Nature	  editorial	  states:	  	  
	  
Instead	  of	  issuing	  a	  full-­‐throated	  defence	  of	  its	  policies,	  and	  the	  thinking	  behind	  them,	  the	  
government	  has	  resorted	  to	  a	  series	  of	  bland	  statements	  about	  its	  commitment	  to	  science	  and	  
the	  commercialisation	  of	  research.	  Only	  occasionally	  does	  the	  mask	  slip	  –	  one	  moment	  of	  
seeming	  frankness	  came	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  May,	  when	  foreign-­‐affairs	  
minister	  John	  Baird	  defended	  the	  NRTEE’s	  demise	  [National	  Round	  Table	  on	  the	  Environment	  
an	  the	  Economy—an	  independent	  source	  of	  expert	  advice	  to	  the	  government	  on	  sustainable	  
economic	  growth]	  by	  noting	  that	  its	  members	  ‘have	  tabled	  more	  than	  ten	  reports	  encouraging	  
a	  carbon	  tax’.	  
	  
Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  hard	  to	  find	  some	  kind	  of	  public	  defence	  of	  the	  Canadian	  government’s	  
policy.	  In	  a	  piece	  published	  in	  the	  March	  2014	  of	  Canadian	  Government	  Executive,	  Serge	  
Dupont,	  the	  deputy	  minister	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  Canada,	  defended	  the	  policy	  that	  
Government	  scientists	  are	  not	  “authorised	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  media	  or	  in	  public	  venues	  on	  any	  
subject	  at	  any	  time”	  by	  noting	  that	  “The	  Communications	  Policy	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  
Canada	  is	  clear	  that	  ministers	  are	  the	  principal	  spokespersons	  for	  the	  government	  and	  senior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  so	  called	  ‘war	  on	  science’,	  see	  Turner	  (2013)	  and	  Dupuis	  (2013).	  A	  
more	  recent	  piece	  is	  Linnit	  http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/carol-­‐linnitt/war-­‐on-­‐science-­‐
canada_b_5775054.html	  




management	  in	  each	  department	  is	  responsible	  for	  designating	  knowledgeable	  staff	  to	  
speak	  in	  an	  official	  capacity	  on	  subjects	  which	  they	  have	  responsibility	  and	  expertise”	  (2014,	  
8).	  He	  added:	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  prerogative	  of	  public	  servants,	  scientists	  or	  others,	  to	  engage	  
with	  the	  media	  without	  training	  and	  without	  proper	  authorisation”.	  But	  how,	  one	  may	  
wonder,	  is	  public	  interest	  best	  served?	  By	  filtering	  or	  massaging	  the	  information	  that	  
scientific	  findings	  make	  available	  so	  that	  it	  may	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  Government’s	  interests	  
before	  it	  is	  communicated	  to	  the	  public?	  Or	  by	  giving	  to	  the	  public	  access	  to	  these	  findings	  
by	  letting	  scientists	  themselves	  disseminate	  this	  information	  and	  express	  their	  considered	  
judgement	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  research	  findings	  for	  issues	  relevant	  to	  the	  public	  (e.g.,	  
public	  health	  etc)?	  If	  the	  former	  strategy	  is	  followed,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  very	  hard	  to	  check	  the	  
credibility	  of	  the	  research	  findings	  and	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  judgements	  concerning	  the	  
possible	  impact	  of	  the	  policies	  politicians	  pursue.	  If	  the	  latter	  strategy	  is	  followed,	  the	  public	  
(including	  other	  scientists,	  of	  course)	  can	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  know	  the	  possible	  
impacts	  and	  to	  evaluate	  and	  challenge	  the	  various	  policies.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  rather	  rare	  defences	  of	  the	  Harper	  Administration	  policy	  came	  by	  Philip	  Cross,	  
former	  chief	  economic	  analyst	  at	  Statistics	  Canada,	  in	  a	  piece	  that	  appeared	  in	  Financial	  Post	  
(October	  21	  2013).	  Cross	  denies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  war	  on	  science	  (without	  of	  course	  denying	  
the	  facts	  noted	  above).	  His	  arguments,	  briefly	  put,	  are	  the	  following.	  First,	  all	  this	  fuss	  about	  
the	  war	  on	  science	  is	  done	  by	  left-­‐wing	  scientists	  and	  activists.	  Second,	  science	  relates	  to	  
economic	  growth	  and	  the	  impediments	  to	  economic	  growth	  (such	  as	  “the	  science	  
underpinning	  environmental	  regulation”)	  should	  be	  reduced	  or	  eliminated.	  Third,	  research	  
should	  be	  directed	  to	  more	  commercial	  ends	  (and	  the	  Harper	  administration	  wants	  to	  do	  
this).	  Fourth,	  government	  scientists	  are	  government	  employees	  and	  hence,	  the	  government,	  
like	  any	  other	  private	  business,	  has	  “the	  right	  to	  control	  what	  is	  communicated	  to	  the	  
media”.	  Corollary	  to	  the	  fourth	  argument:	  if	  government	  scientists	  want	  ‘academic	  freedom’	  
they	  should	  apply	  for	  jobs	  in	  the	  academia;	  but	  most	  do	  not	  have	  “the	  credentials	  to	  do	  so”.	  
Fifth,	  as	  the	  journal	  Economist	  (October	  19	  2013)	  has	  recently	  stressed,	  there	  is	  lots	  of	  
shoddy	  research	  in	  science,	  with	  results	  that	  cannot	  be	  replicated	  or	  are	  disproved.31	  
	   Though	  more	  could	  be	  said	  in	  reply	  to	  this	  battery	  of	  arguments,	  the	  following	  seems	  
sufficient.	  The	  first	  argument	  is	  simply	  ad	  hominem.	  The	  second	  is	  wrong-­‐headed.	  Science	  
does	  relate	  to	  economic	  growth,	  but	  the	  latter	  should	  not	  be	  unregulated;	  nor	  of	  course,	  
should	  science	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  market	  forces.	  The	  third	  argument	  relies	  on	  the	  principle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  The	  journal	  Economist	  titled	  its	  Leader:	  Problems	  with	  Scientific	  Research:	  How	  Science	  goes	  Wrong.	  
The	  verdict,	  briefly	  put,	  is	  that	  “modern	  scientists	  are	  doing	  too	  much	  trusting	  and	  not	  enough	  
verifying—to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  science,	  and	  of	  humanity”.	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that	  those	  who	  fund	  the	  research	  should	  decide	  what	  the	  research	  should	  be	  about.	  Even	  if	  
this	  were	  correct	  for	  a	  private	  institution	  (which	  is	  not),	  it	  is	  far	  from	  correct	  for	  a	  public	  
institution	  such	  as	  the	  government,	  where	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  public	  welfare	  and	  the	  public	  
interest	  should	  be	  prominent.	  The	  fourth	  argument	  is	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  third.	  The	  reply	  is	  
simply	  that	  governments	  of	  democratic	  societies	  should	  not	  be	  like	  executive	  boards	  of	  
private	  firms.	  Finally,	  the	  fifth	  argument	  is,	  at	  best,	  exaggerated.	  Even	  if	  the	  article	  by	  
Economist	  were	  onto	  something,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  scientists	  themselves	  have	  the	  tools	  to	  make	  
research	  more	  error-­‐proof	  and	  more	  reliable.	  The	  reproducibility	  of	  experimental	  findings	  is	  
clearly	  an	  important	  desideratum	  in	  science.	  But	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  experiments	  become	  all	  
the	  more	  complex	  and	  delicate,	  reproducibility	  is	  not	  always	  achievable.	  What	  matters	  most	  
is	  not	  the	  reproducibility	  itself	  but	  the	  strength	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  evidence	  supports	  the	  
theory.	  The	  CERN	  experiments	  in	  high-­‐energy	  physics	  are	  hardly	  replicable.	  Is	  this	  a	  reason	  
to	  distrust	  them?	  
What’s	  important	  for	  our	  purposes,	  I	  think,	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  value	  of	  science	  
tacitly	  implied	  by	  arguments	  such	  as	  the	  above,	  viz.,	  that	  science	  should	  be	  subordinate	  to	  
various	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  interests,	  including	  the	  government	  and	  its	  economic	  
and	  political	  agenda.	  It’s	  not	  far	  from	  this	  that	  when	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  science	  and	  
the	  dominant	  social	  values,	  or	  those	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  dominant	  social	  values,	  it	  
should	  be	  science	  that	  has	  to	  yield.	  This	  is	  an	  ideological	  conception	  of	  science	  and	  its	  value;	  
and	  it	  is	  not	  new.	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  new	  in	  Canada	  is	  the	  way	  this	  conception	  of	  science	  is	  
effected,	  viz.,	  by	  curbing	  the	  sources	  of	  data	  and	  evidence	  on	  which	  science	  thrives.	  	  
Note	  that	  the	  argument	  from	  underdetermination	  we	  have	  been	  discussing	  lends	  no	  
credence	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  policy	  or	  value	  of	  curbing	  evidence.	  We	  have	  already	  stressed	  that	  
though	  evidence	  does	  not	  speak	  with	  the	  voice	  of	  an	  angel,	  it	  can	  decisively	  turn	  the	  balance	  
in	  favour	  of	  one	  theory	  over	  its	  rivals.	  Evidence	  is	  clearly	  necessary	  for	  doing	  science	  and	  
doing	  it	  right.	  And	  even	  if	  evidence	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  even	  if,	  that	  is,	  scientific	  judgement,	  
being	  non-­‐algorithmic,	  involves	  more	  than	  evidential	  considerations,	  various	  kinds	  of	  
epistemic	  values	  can	  and	  do	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  determining	  theory-­‐choice.	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  
section	  3.1,	  the	  need	  to	  appeal	  to	  social	  values	  in	  solving	  problems	  of	  evidential	  ties	  is	  not	  as	  
rampant	  as	  it	  has	  been	  supposed.	  Far	  from	  being	  supported	  by	  the	  argument	  from	  
underdetermination,	  the	  challenges	  to	  underdetermination	  noted	  in	  section	  2	  suggest	  that	  
curbing	  sources	  of	  evidence	  is	  detrimental	  to	  theory-­‐appraisal	  and	  choice.	  Precisely	  because	  
there	  can	  be	  evidential	  support	  to	  a	  theory	  from	  what	  is	  not	  among	  its	  observational	  
consequences,	  and	  precisely	  because	  there	  can	  be	  evidential	  support	  to	  a	  theory	  by	  hitherto	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unforeseen	  evidence	  (made	  available	  when	  the	  theory	  is	  conjoined	  with	  future	  auxiliary	  
assumptions),	  the	  cost	  of	  curbing	  or	  stifling	  evidence	  cannot	  be	  anticipated	  because	  we	  
cannot	  predict	  which	  theories,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  will	  be	  supported	  by	  fresh	  evidence.	  In	  
fact,	  curbing	  evidence	  amounts	  to	  a	  sure	  strategy	  for	  cutting	  off	  the	  roots	  of	  science	  and	  
theory-­‐appraisal.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  curbing	  evidence,	  as	  followed	  by	  the	  Harper	  
government	  policies	  in	  Canada,	  inevitably	  hinders	  innovation	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	  
unpredictable	  aspect	  of	  theory-­‐evidence	  relations.32	  
Curbing	  the	  sources	  of	  evidence	  is	  a	  social	  value.	  Given	  what	  I	  noted	  above,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
right	  value	  since	  it	  is	  not	  universalisable.	  It	  expresses	  the	  interests	  of	  only	  those	  who	  may	  
stand	  to	  lose	  from	  an	  unfettered	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  its	  finding.	  But	  valuing	  evidence	  is	  a	  
social	  value	  too.	  What	  makes	  it	  the	  right	  social	  value	  is	  that	  it	  is	  conducive	  to	  socially	  
responsible	  science.	  It	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  just	  that.	  Importantly,	  evidence	  is	  conducive	  to	  
epistemically	  responsible	  science.	  But	  though	  this	  goes	  without	  saying,	  what	  matters	  for	  our	  
present	  purposes	  is	  that	  evidence	  can	  cast	  light	  on	  important	  social	  issues	  by	  unravelling	  
their	  causes	  and	  by	  dispelling	  various	  ideological	  assumptions	  or	  prejudices.	  The	  
precautionary	  principle	  we	  discussed	  above	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  And	  though	  valuing	  evidence	  
might	  well	  be	  a	  perspectival	  value,	  it	  is	  a	  universalisable	  value.	  Barring	  those	  whose	  interests	  
are	  in	  suppressing	  sources	  of	  evidence,	  looking	  for	  evidence	  and	  subjecting	  beliefs	  and	  
theories	  to	  evidential	  scrutiny	  are	  values	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  human	  flourishing.	  
In	  the	  current	  debate	  about	  the	  death	  of	  evidence	  in	  Canada,	  we	  see	  in	  action	  proof	  of	  
the	  claim	  that	  though	  science	  is	  not	  free	  of	  social	  values,	  it	  matters	  a	  lot	  what	  these	  values	  
are	  and	  whose	  values	  they	  are.	  What	  ultimately	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  value	  of	  evidence	  in	  science	  
and	  in	  public	  life.	  Evidence	  should	  always	  be	  wanted:	  alive	  or	  dead!	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